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Uniformity In State Inheritance Laws: How UPC 
Article II Has Fared In Nine Enactments 
Richard V. Wellman* 

James W. Gordon** 

The Uniform Probate Code was drafted to facilitate mod­
ernization, simplification, and uniformity of state inheritance 
laws. Since its approval by the National Conference of Commis
sioners on Uniform State Laws and by the American Bar Asso
ciation in August 1969, the Code has been enacted in various 
forms by 11 states. In this article, Messrs. Wellman and Gordon 
analyze significant deviations from the recommended version of 
article II in the first nine enactments of the UPC. The authors 
argue that all but exceptionally meritorious changes in enacted 
versions of the UPC should give way to the goal of state uniform­
ity in inheritance laws, and find the majority of the changes to 
be unjustifiable. In evaluating the merits of the changes, the 
authors consider UPC policies behind individual sections of the 
Code as well as state reasons for deviations. 
Article II of the Uniform Probate Code deals with the sub­
stantive rules of intestate succession, family protection, and 
wills. 1 This article identifies and analyzes the substantial devia­
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1. UNIFORM PRoBATE ConE [hereinafter cited as UPC]. 
Article II of the Code contains nine parts: Intestate Succession, Elective Share of 
Surviving Spouse, Spouse and Children Unprovided For in Wills, Exempt Property and 
Allowances, Wills, Rules of Construction, Contractual Arrangements Relating to Death, 
General Provisions, and Custody and Deposit of Wills. This article does not examine state 
adaptations of Part 2 of art. IT dealing with the elective share of the surviving spouse since 
deviations from this part of the Code were anticipated, if not encouraged. In fact, the 
Code's recommendations on this aspect of inheritance law appear to have stimulated am 
increase in the variety of extant and proposed solutions to problems respecting disinheri­
tance of spouses, demonstrating that it will be many more years before anything resem­
bling a dominant or uniform pattern of American law can be expected to emerge. Even 
Idaho and Arizona, the first two community property states to accept the Code, followed 
somewhat different courses in relation to the elective share problem. 
Alterations in § 2-801 dealing with the doctrine of renunciation also receive no treat­
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tions from the provisions of article II that have occurred in the 
first nine UPC enactments: Alaska,2 Arizona,3 Colorado, 4 ldaho,5 
Montana,6 Nebraska/ North Dakota,8 South Dakota,9 and Utah. 10 
Part I of the article discusses general policies underlying UPC 
article IT. Part IT treats the various state adaptations by code 
section, considering principles behind the individual sections and 
analyzing deviations from the UPC provisions that were not 
adopted as recommended. 11 
ment in this article. This section, as approved in the 1969 draft of the UPC, represented 
a modification of recommendations made by a study and drafting committee of the Ameri­
can Bar Association's Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section. See Special Comm. 
on Disclaimer Legislation, Disclaimer of Testamentary and Nontestamentary Disposi­
tions-Suggestions for a Model Act, 3 REAL PROP. PRos. & TRUST J. 131 (1968). This ABA 
study later formed the basis of a separate drafting effort by the National Conference. of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws which resulted, in 1973, in new proposals for 
uniform state laws regarding renunciation of transfers and successions. UNIFORM Dis­
CLAIMER OF TRANSFERS BY WILL, INTESTACY OR APPOINTMENT ACT; UNIFORM DISCLAIMER OF 
TRANSFERS UNDER NONTESTAMENTARY INSTRUMENTS ACT; UNIFORM DISCLAIMER OF PROPERTY 
INTERESTS ACT [in 1973 HANDBOOK OF THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM 
STATE LAws 204, 212, 217]. Recently, the groups that have continued to be concerned with 
the shape and fate of the Uniform Probate Code adapted UPC § 2-801, a section proposed 
by the National Conference dealing with renunciation, to the 1973 uniform law. 
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNIFORM PROBATE CoDE (in 1975 NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON 
UNIFORM STATE LAws]. These amendments appear in the 1975 edition of the UPC, re­
cently published by West Publishing Company. In the meantime, several states, including 
those enacting the Uniform Probate Code, have enacted legislation reflecting various 
stages of these continuing national drafting efforts. The resulting statutory variants merit 
comparison, but the topic is essentially unrelated to the theme of deviations from the 
UPC. 
Finally, this article does not consider the matters covered in§ 2-803, dealing with the 
effect of homicide on inheritance. The National Conference of Commissioners placed this 
section in brackets to indicate they did not attach to it the usual recommendation for 
uniform enactment. The Com"inissioners expected the deviations that have occurred in all 
but two enactments of this section. 
2. ALASKA STAT. § 13 (1972). 
3. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974). 
4. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-10 to -17 (1973). 
5. IDAHO ConE tit. 15 (Supp. 1975). 
6. MoNT. REv. ConEs ANN. § 91A (Spec. Uniform Prob. Code Pamphlet 1975). 
7. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 30-2201 to -2902 (Cum. Supp. 1974). 
8. N.D. CENT. ConE§ 30.1 (Spec. Uniform Prob. Code Supp. 1975). 
9. S.D. UNIFORM PROB. ConE §§ 1-101 et seq. (1975). On February 27, 1976, however, 
the South Dakota legislature voted in favor of HB 712 to repeal this statute, effective later 
this year. Despite the repeal of the statute, a discussion of its provisions in this article is 
merited in view of the overall purpose of the article, which is to weigh reasons for various 
state changes against the UPC policies behind recommended Code provisions. 
10. UTAH ConE ANN. § 75 (Spec. Supp. 1975). 
11. Many of the sections in art. II have been adopted in all of the UPC states studied 
either without modification or with such minor change that the sense of the Code language 
is preserved. In none of the states were more than a handful of major changes made. 
Presumably, the unaltered and insignificantly altered sections represent rules of inheri­
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I. UPC POLICY GOALS 
A. In General 
Analysis of state adaptations of the UPC requires considera­
tion of the policy goals the UPC drafters sought to implement. 
Those goals include the following: (1) to provide, by law, an ac­
ceptable estate plan for those of modest means who, through 
reliance or default, leave their estates to be disposed of in accord­
ance with laws governing intestacies;12 (2) to bring probate law 
into the 20th century by making it responsive to modern atti­
tudes;13 (3) to enable the will to become a more popular instru­
ment for disposition of wealth-at death; 14 ( 4) to facilitate inter 
vivos and post mortem estate planning by providing clear guide­
lines for draftsmen and maximum flexibility for estate planners; 15 
(5) to provide substantive rules that facilitate efficient estate 
administration; 16 and (6) to encourage uniformity of law in an 
area where a substantial segment of our population is inconven­
ienced by various parochial rules that serve no significant local 
17purpose.
Attainment of the first goal, improvement of the law's estate 
plan, should benefit both the average estate owner and the profes­
sional estate planner. The average estate owner should benefit 
from Code rules governing intestacy and related procedures that 
are designed to more accurately reflect the desires of most per­
sons. Estate planners should benefit from the decreased necessity 
of drawing wills for and administering small estates, where ade­
quate compensation is more the exception than the rule. They 
also may benefit from new, more precise, inheritance concepts 
which can be incorporated into custom plans. 
The second goal, modernizing inheritance rules, reflects the 
state of present probate law in the United States that perpetuates 
many historical rules that long ago ceased to make sense. Despite 
tance that lend themselves more readily to uniform acceptance than those rules expressed 
in the altered sections. 
12. UPC art. TI, pt. 1, General Comment. 
13. /d. 
14. /d. art. II, pt. 5, General Comment. 
15. See, e.g., Moore, Estate Planning Opportunities Which May Be Possible Under 
the Uniform Probate Code, 1 EsTATE PLANNING 83 (1974); Wellman, Some Effects of the 
Uniform Probate Code on Estate Planning, 4 INST. EsTATE PLANNING ch. 70-19 (1970). 
16. The procedure provided in § 2-404 for establishing and satisfying the family 
allowance and the elimination of remote relatives as heirs in § 2-103 provide an illustra­
tion. 
17. See notes 30-36 and accompanying text infra. 
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the efficacy of most law, community respect for legal rules suffers 
when, as is true of many points of inheritance law, today's case 
results are explainable only by reference to notions that clash 
with current mores. To help alleviate this anomaly, the Code 
eliminates discrimination in inheritance laws against "half­
bloods," illegitimates, aliens, and females. 18 The Code also rede­
fines the status of adopted children to reflect modern perceptions 
of the family, 19 abolishes the difference for probate purposes be­
tween realty and personalty, 20 and eliminates the so-called 
"laughing heir" by limiting succession to those relatives de­
scended from a grandparent of the decedent. 21 
The third goal, making the will a more popular tool for dispo­
sition of wealth at death, is attractive to all who oppose the drift 
to more complexity in simple matters. Its achievement will ena­
ble the wishes of more decedents to be realized. To further this 
goal, the Code minimizes the formalities required for execution 
of a will, 22 validates holographs, 23 eliminates penalties on benefi­
ciary witnesses, 24 and allows extrinsic writings to be incorporated 
into wills by reference or to be utilized without incorporation to 
pass certain tangible personal property.25 Moreover, the UPC low­
ers the age of competency to make a will to 1826 and gives a 
testator broader ability to choose the law that will govern the 
provisions of his will. 27 Most importantly, it offers executors and 
their counselors approximately the same flexibility and freedom 
from judicial supervision of estates as that presently available to 
trustees under inter vivos instruments.28 
Facilitation of inter vivos and post mortem estate planning, 
the fourth goal, is accomplished principally by provisions sprin­
kled throughout the Code that are designed to free fiduciary ad­
ministration of trusts and estates from unnecessary court control. 
Article II's chief contributions to estate planners are found in its 
provisions that liberate the will from needless formalities and 
18. UPC §§ 2-107, -109, -112. The Code is consistently impartial with regard to sex. 
19. ld. §§ 2-109, -611. 
20. Id. §§ 1-201(11) & (33), 2-101, 3-101. 
21. Id. § 2-103. 
22. Id. § 2-502. 
23. Id. § 2-503. 
24. Id. § 2-505. 
25. Id. §§ 2-510, -513. The Code also gives effect to events of independent signifi­
cance. Id. § 2-512. 
26. ld. § 2-501. 
27. Id. §§ 2-506, -602. 
28. See id. art. Ill, General Comment. 
357] UNIFORMITY IN STATE INHERITANCE LAWS 361 
improve renunciation as a means of post mortem estate plan­
ning.29 
Article II contributes to the fifth goal, simplifying estate 
administration, principally by its family protection provisions 
that are designed to function without the necessity of court orders 
for support of dependents. 
The final goal, uniformity of state laws, has been somewhat 
controversial. The debate over this goal is sufficiently intense to 
justify an extended analysis. 
B. The Goal of Uniformity 
The pros and cons regarding uniformity can be reduced to a 
conflict between the interests of probate specialists and the inter­
ests of estate owners. Legally trained people who tend to equate 
legal tradition with common sense and who have a vested interest 
in maintaining complexity and diversity in the law are likely to 
view uniformity of inheritance law as unnecessary, unwise, and 
politically unattainable.30 On the other hand, lay persons are apt 
to view inheritance laws as unnecessarily complex and conclude 
that elimination of differences between state rules of inheritance 
is an obvious and desirable way of simplifying matters.31 The 
problems inherent in the present diversity of inheritance laws are 
particularly burdensome to elderly persons who are under the 
most immediate pressure to plan their estates around the varia­
tions of rules in the states with which they have, or may later 
have, contacts.32 
Despite the furor, however, states are in basic agreement 
that, subject only to the rights of creditors and taxing authorities, 
owners may dispose of their estates by will as they see fit. The 
points where state laws restrict freedom of testation are relatively 
few and unimportant;33 the bulk of our diverse probate rules exist 
29. See authorities cited note 15 supra. Provisions in arts. Ill, V, VI, and Vll also aid 
in facilitating inter vivos and post mortem estate planning. 
30. See generally Zartman, An Illinois Critique of the Uniform Probate Code, 1970 
u. ILL. L.F. 413. 
31. See, e.g., Settling An Estate, CHANGING TIMES, THE KIPLINGER MAGAZINE, Nov. 
1972, at 6. 
32. The National Retired Teachers Association and the American Association of 
Retired Persons (NRTA-AARP) have endorsed the Code since 1972. Brickfield, AARP 
Comes to Your Legislature, MoDERN MATURITY, April-May 1974, at 26. 
33. These include the protection of spouses in one another's estate, protection of 
children against parental disinheritance, the proper categorization of unworthy heirs, the 
propriety of legal t'estraints on gifts by will to aliens and charities, and differences regard­
ing the capacity of minors and felons to make wills. See G. PALMER, TRusTs AND SuccESSION 
362 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1976: 
merely to support and protect testamentary intention, including, 
for purposes of this discussion, the presumed intentions of intes­
tates that provide the principal rationale for statutes covering 
descent and distribution. Since any general state interest in sup­
porting owners' intentions would be best served by keeping the 
rules that guide owners as clear and as simple as possible, it 
would seem that a state would serve its own interests best by 
aligning with widely recognized national standards on all rules 
that do not reflect conceded, parochial restraints on testamentary 
freedom. For example, it should not matter, as a point of state 
policy, what words in a will are sufficient to disinherit afterbom 
children, so long as the principle of testator control is conceded. 
Therefore, for the sake of clarity and simplicity, a state should 
align its rule on this point to nationally recommended formulae 
that are most likely to be known and heeded. Similarly, it should 
not matter to a particular state whether an intestate's descen­
dants take per stirpes or per capita; the point is to have a clear 
rule that is likely to be widely understood. So viewed, the public 
interest in unifying and thus simplifying inheritance matters for 
our mobile population should predominate over any parochial 
view about how testamentary intention may be served best. 34 
A serious move toward uniformity of inheritance rules also 
provides· the benefit of creating an opportunity to review old poli­
cies that have remained unquestioned, possibly for generations. 
Some points of policy difference between the states regarding 
restrictions on testamentary freedom should disappear as legisla­
tors take a fresh look at such questions as whether it makes sense 
to restrain charitable testamentary gifts,35 whether to continue 
189-213 (2d ed. 1968); T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF WILLS 100-158 (2d ed. 1953) 
[hereinafter cited as ATKINSON]. 
34. As suggested in note 33 supra, there are substantive points on which states differ, 
and will continue to differ, even with the UPC in effect. However, it does not follow from 
the concession that states may continue to differ in their laws regarding the protection of 
spouses and children from disinheritance and regarding devises to aliens, charities, and 
certain others that all other rules of inheritance must likewise remain diverse. As indicated 
earlier, no problems touching the areas of substantive policy difference arise in the vast 
majority of estates. SeeM. SusSMAN, J. CATES & D. SMITH, THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE 
(1970) [hereinafter cited as SussMAN]. Further, the most familiar form of legal protection 
against prohibited disinheritance of spouses and children is structured so that the inter­
ests to be protected, like the spouse's interest in community property, are simply placed 
beyond the reach of the decedent's will. ATKINSON 123. Even variations among states 
concerning the amount of a decedent's estate. that will be protected for the spouse and 
children from creditors' claims do not detract from the desirability of uniform rules for 
whatever property remains for distribution. 
35. Cf. In re Cavill's Estate, 329 A.2d 503 (Pa. 1974) (holding invalid Pennsylvania's 
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ancient disabilities regarding inheritances of aliens and felons, 
and whether to maintain probate exemption levels established 
generations ago. 
A possible objection to achieving uniformity in any area of 
the law is that local reliance on established rules makes a major 
revision of existing law untenable. However, no pattern of com­
munity reliance or individual expectation, other than the inter­
ests of the professionals in keeping the rules parochial, can be 
pointed to that would justify retention of existing, variant inheri­
tance laws. There are data indicating that most decedents' es­
tates are controlled by wills" that reject statutory rules.36 This 
suggests the antithesis of reliance on existing rules and demon­
strates that current statutory rules do not conform to most peo­
ple's desires concerning distribution of their estates. Also, the 
familiar concept that the law does not protect expectancies is 
completely congenial to the idea that legislation may change an­
cient rules of inheritance to align with national norms. In any 
event, since such unifying legislation would only apply to estates 
of persons dying after it becomes effective, rights existing under 
former rules would not be disrupted. 
In short, it seems clear that the general public, as opposed 
to governmental and legal specialists who have vested interests 
in existing inheritance laws, would benefit significantly from sim­
plified and uniform inheritance rules. This article, therefore, will 
focus on whether enacted deviations from article II can be justi­
fied in light of the public policy favoring uniformity and simplic­
ity over a state legislature's interest in adopting deviant rules. 
II. ARTICLE II SECTIONS AND STATE CHANGES 
With a single minor exception, none of the enacted changes 
in UPC article II warrant deviation from the goal of uniformity. 
Their appearance in enactments that otherwise embrace the goal 
of interstate uniformity may be attributed to the failure of enact­
ing legislatures to understand some UPC provisions. Hence, state 
reasons for each change will be analyzed and weighed against the 
UPC rationale for the original provisions. 
100-year-old statute invalidating certain bequests for charitable or religious purposes as 
a denial of equal protection of law). 
36. See SussMAN 62-120; Drury, The Uniform Probate Code and Illinois Probate 
Practice, 6 LoYOLA U.L.J. 303 (1975); Johnson, The Abolition of Dower in Virginia: The 
Uniform Probate Code As An Alternative To Proposed Legislation, 7 U. RicH. L. REv. 99 
(1972). 
.­
364 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1976: 
A. Section 2-102: Share of the Spouse 
UPC section 2-102 gives the intestate's spouse all of the es­
tate up to $50,000 and one-half of any balance, as against any 
common issue or a parent. If, however, the intestate left issue by 
a prior marriage, the spouse's interest is reduced as against the 
issue to one-half of the entire estate. If no issue survives, the 
spouse receives the first $50,000 and divides the excess with the 
intestate's surviving parent or parents. 
Six of the nine adopting states have altered this section sub­
stantially.37 Two major alterations deserve attention: the omis­
sion of parents from any determination of the spouse's share, and 
the modification of the $50,000 threshold figure. 
1. Omission of parents from determination of the spouse's share 
The Code decision to allow the decedent's surviving parents 
to share in relatively large (over $50,000) intestate estates where 
no issue of the decedent survives reflects several competing con­
siderations. On one hand, there is a desire to leave a generous 
share for the spouse since she likely would depend on the estate 
for support. On the other hand, some persons who die relatively 
early in life leave substantial estates derived in part from gifts or 
other advantages bestowed by parents. Naturally, many of these 
persons wish to return some of their wealth to their parents. By 
providing the spouse with at least the first $50,000, the UPC 
effectuates the decedent's likely intent to provide for her support. 
Allowing the decedent's parents to share in the balance is a rea­
sonable approach to satisfying the decedent's desire to return 
excess wealth back to his family rather than eventually to his 
spouse's family through her estate. If the intestate's parents do 
not wish to receive the wealth, however, the Code facilitates their 
renunciation, which could have the effect, without gift tax cost, 
of leaving the spouse as the sole heir.38 
Arizona, Colorado, and Montana39 have found the UPC pol­
icy of providing a large share40 of the intestate estate to the surviv­
37. Those states are Arizona, Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, Utah, and South Da­
kota. 
38. See UPC § 2-801. 
39. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-2102 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974); CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 15-11-102 (1973); MoNT. REv. CoDES ANN. § 91A-2-102 (Spec. Uniform Prob. Code 
Pamphlet 1975). 
40. R. WELLMAN, RESPONSE OF THE JOINT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM PRoBATE 
ConE TO THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA's "THE UNIFORM PROBATE CoDE: ANALYSIS AND 
CRITIQUE" 3 (1974). 
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ing spouse to be paramount and have thus omitted the decedent's 
parents from any determination of the surviving spouse's shareY 
Without considering the goal of uniformity, the exclusion of 
parents from this section by these three states is arguably a pro­
gressive change. The Code's compromise approach presents ob­
vious problems. It may be doubted whether the decedent would 
favor his parents over his spouse, even to the extent of one-half 
of the excess of his estate over $50,000-particularly where his 
own energies were responsible for his wealth. It is also unlikely 
that the average person would want to push his assets back a 
generation, thereby inflating the estate of his parents upon its 
later probate. 
However, two responses in favor of uniform adoption of sec­
tion 2-102 should be noted. First, most of the identified problems 
will arise only rarely since net distributable estates exceeding 
$50,000 in value usually are not intestate.42 Second, it is simple 
to adjust succession laws to the needs of larger estates by means 
of a will or renunciations. The provision under discussion resulted 
from a carefully considered compromise in the National Confer­
ence, allowing parents some inheritance, first, in partial defer­
ence to long tradition, and, second, in order to mesh inheritance 
rights with the not unfamiliar pattern of children supporting par­
ents in their declining years. The goal of giving more of the estate 
to the spouse was the principal objective of the drafters and the 
National Conference. This big step was made more palatable for 
some Commissioners because it was surrounded by comfortingly 
familiar features from present inheritance law. These same con­
siderations should have local appeal. In any event, the position 
of the national Code on the point was reached after careful evalu­
ation of all arguments and, given the importance of achieving 
uniformity, should prevail over alternative positions. 
41. The UPC provided the surviving spouse a larger share of the intestate's estate in 
order to reflect the desires of most married persons. UPC § 2-102, Comment; SusSMAN 289­
90. Most lawyers would probably agree that in small to moderate estates, a deceased 
spouse usually leaves his entire estate to the surviving spouse. The inheritance pattern of 
the UPC reflects this empirical reality. Note that Montana has undermined this policy 
by reducing the share of the surviving spouse to one-third where there are issue of the 
decedent surviving who are not also issue of the spouse. MoNT. REv. CoDES ANN. § 91A­
102(2)(a)(b) (Spec. Uniform Prob. Code Pamphlet 1975). 
42. See SusSMAN 73-76; Drury, supra note 36, at 314-15; Johnson, supra note 36, at 
113-14. 
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2. Modification of the $50,000 threshold 
Another variance in section 2-102 concerns the $50,000 share 
for the spouse. The National Conference invited deviations from 
this provision by bracketing the figure, thus signaling that the 
amount was merely recommended for uniform enactment rather 
than mandated. This concession to local judgment aided accept­
ance of the major change-giving the spouse all of most modest 
estates. It also reflected recognition by the National Conference 
that a figure like $50,000 may have different significance in differ­
ent parts of the country. 
Five of the enacting states, Arizona, Colorado, Nebraska, 
South Dakota, and Utah, changed the $50,000 threshold figure 
suggested by the National Conference.43 In cases where there is 
no surviving issue, Utah and South Dakota give the surviving 
spouse the first $100,000. The decedent's parents then become 
entitled to one-half of the excess. 44 In cases where only common 
issue of the decedent and the spouse survive, Utah adopts the 
Code's $50,000 threshold; 45 South Dakota, however, continues to 
use the $100,000 figure. 46 Nebraska allows the spouse $35,000 be­
fore requiring her to divide the excess with the next takers, 
whether they be issue or the decedent's parents.47 Colorado's 
threshold is $25,000, the excess to be shared only with issue (par­
ents having been excluded by the statute as noted above). 48 The 
emerging pattern of enacted figures tends to sustain the judgment 
of the National Conference that $50,000 is about right. 
Arizona, a community property state, gives the surviving 
spouse the entire estate in both the decedent's separate property 
and his share of the community, unless there are issue of the 
decedent surviving who are not also issue of the surviving spouse. 
In the latter event, the spouse receives one-half of the decedent's 
separate property and none of the decedent's share of the com­
43. UPC § 2-102; ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 14-2102 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974); Cow. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 15-11-102 (1973); NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2302 (Cum. Supp. 1974); S.D. UNI­
FORM PRoB. ConE§ 2-102 (1975); UTAH ConE ANN. § 75-2-102 (Spec. Supp. 1975). 
44. S.D. UNIFORM PRoB. ConE § 2-102(2) (1975); UTAH ConE ANN. § 75-2-102(1)(b) 
(Spec. Supp. 1975). 
45. UTAH ConE ANN. § 75-2-102(1)(c) (Spec. Supp. 1975). 
46. S.D. UNIFORM PRos. ConE § 2-102(3) (1975). 
47. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2302(2)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1974). 
48. Cow. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 15-11-102(I)(b) (1973). The elimination of parents from 
succession in Colorado whenever there is a surviving spouse reduces the pecuniary share 
versus fractional interest problem that is implicit in any monetary threshold, but leaves 
the problem to be faced in cases of estates that are shared by the spouse and issue. 
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munity .49 This variation on the Code eliminates all dollar-amount 
step problems, but it may be difficult to accept in common law 
states. 
B. Section 2-103: Share of Heirs 

Other Than Surviving Spouse 

Section 2-103 deals with inheritance of that portion of the 
estate not passing to the spouse and, in an effort to eliminate 
remote relatives as potential heirs, excludes persons who are not 
descended from the decedent's grandparents. Utah, Colorado, 
Montana, and Nebraska altered this section in a way that works 
considerable damage to the Code objective of eliminating remote 
heirs.50 These four states have added language that perpetuates 
inheritance by more remote relations and preserves the concomi­
tant problem of the "laughing heir ."51 
The possibility of inheritance by remote relatives is attribut­
able to English tradition where no escheat would occur as long as 
some blood relative survived. The principle, possibly sensible in 
its medieval, agricultural setting, does not serve well in 
contemporary society. Today's families exhibit little of the cohe­
siveness of the past, and remote relatives fit only awkwardly in 
the circle of persons deemed to be preferred as successors by most 
persons. It follows that the decedent is likely to have disinherited 
the remote heir in favor of some preferred friend or charity. In­
deed, studies show that persons with wealth and no close relatives 
usually make wills that presumably accomplish this end. Thus, 
under modem conditions, allowing a remote relative to inherit 
results in a windfall. 
An intestate scheme that allows remote relatives to inherit 
49. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-2102 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974). This is one of the most 
constructive changes made by any of the states. By giving the surviving spouse the entire 
estate (absent issue of the decedent who are not also issue of the surviving spouse) UPC 
§ 2-102 is simplified, the valuation problem is removed, the decedent's probable intent is 
fulfilled, and the possibility of guardianship for minor. or dependent children of the dece­
dent is avoided. The guardianship possibility should be rare in any case since it is unlikely 
that an estate worth more than $50,000 would pass by intestacy. 
50. Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-103 (Cum. Supp. 1975); MoNT. REv. CoDES ANN. 
§ 91A-2-103 (Spec. Uniform Prob. Code Pamphlet 1975); NEB. REv. STAT.§ 30-2303 (Cum. 
Supp. 1974); UTAH CoDE ANN.§ 75-2-103 (Spec. Supp. 1975). Montana's change is perhaps 
the most verbally complicated in the Code. See MoNT. REv. CoDES ANN. § 91A-2-103(2) 
(Spec. Uniform Prob. Code Pamphlet 1975). 
51. For a full discussion of the "laughing heir" problem see ELY, PROPERTY AND CoN­
TRACT IN THEIR RELATIONS TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 421-22 (1914); Cavers, Change 
in the American Family and the "Laughing Heir", 20 IowA L. REv. 203 (1935). 
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produces undesirable results even when a person dies testate. If 
the will is to be probated formally rather than informally, obscure 
heirs in far away places must be located and given notice. This 
expensive process is required merely to satisfy the court that a 
due search for heirs has occurred. Furthermore, sending notice to 
remote relatives invites will contests;52 remote relatives may lack 
restraint about challenging the decedent's will, whereas closer 
relatives are likely to respect the decedent's dispositive plan. 
Thus, a state's failure to follow the Code pattern on this point, 
even when a person dies testate, is likely to produce windfalls, 
expensive pedigree searches, attempts to locate and give notice 
to remote heirs, will contests, and losses to charities to the extent 
that remote heirs prevail in those contests. 
C. Section 2-106: Representation 
Section 2-106 describes the Code system of representation by 
descendants, which calls for a distribution that is a mixture of the 
familiar patterns of per stirpes and per capita.53 The section pro­
vides for an initial division of the portion of an estate passing to 
"issue" of the intestate, his parents, or his grandparents, at the 
generation nearest to the ancestor where there is at least one 
living taker. The estate is divided into as many shares as there 
are, of this generation, living heirs and deceased relatives who left 
issue. Living heirs receive full shares. Surviving issue take as 
representatives of the deceased, dividing equally the decedent's 
share; the representation process is repeated if a group of repre­
sentatives includes living descendants and surviving issue of de­
ceased descendants. The approach permits equal treatment of 
descendants who are closest to the ancestor and preserves the 
traditional pattern of representation where one or more, but not 
all, of the nearest generation have died leaving issue. 54 
All of the UPC states have followed the Code pattern with 
the exception of Utah, which adhered to a pure per stirpes for­
mula so that grandchildren of the decedent take the shares their 
52. UPC § 3-302. Probating the will informally is attended by a risk of a will contest 
that lasts for at least 3 years after death. Id. § 3-108. 
53. See id. § 2-106, Comment. 
54. See Waggoner, A Proposed Alternative to the Uniform Probate Code's System for 
Intestate Distribution Among Descendants, 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 626 (1971). See generally 
Wormser, Per Stirpes or Per Capita, 105 TRusTs & EsTATES 91, 92 (1966). For an excellent 
discussion of some relevant aspects of inheritance by collaterals see Atkinson, Succession 
Among Collaterals, 20 IowA L. REv. 185 (1935). 
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parents would have taken even if all the decedent's children are 
dead.55 
D. Section 2-109: Meaning of Child and Related Terms 
Section 2-109 sets out the meaning of "child" and related 
terms in order to eliminate ancient discrimination against illegiti­
mate children and to transplant adopted children entirely into a 
relationship with the adoptive parents and their kin. Of the en­
acting states, only Montana and Colorado altered this section of 
the Code.56 
Montana adhered to its traditional policy of allowing 
adopted children to inherit through natural parents57 by omitting 
the Code language of section 2-109 (1) that denies this right. 
Many, perhaps most, non-UPC states permit adopted children to 
inherit from both their natural and adoptive families. The Code 
theory, however, reflects more recent statutory patterns that per­
mit adoption to accomplish its purpose of making the adopted 
child solely and completely the child of his new parents. Vestigial 
connections with natural relatives contradict this policy.58 The 
Montana position means, inter alia, that the adopted child is 
entitled, along with other heirs, to receive notice when a will of a 
close natural relative is formally probated. If the other survivors 
have enough information to give such notice to adopted children, 
55. UTAH ConE ANN. § 75-2-106 (Spec. Supp. 1975). 
The original enactment in Colorado included a uniquely obscure formulation for 
inheritance by descendants from ancestors more remote from the intestate than grandpar­
ents. Its version of § 2-103 rejected the Code effort to avoid inheritance by very remote 
relatives. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-103(e) (1973), until amended in 1975, provided: 
If none of the relatives above enumerated [e.g., those related to the intestate 
as his descendants or those of his parents or grandparents] be living, then to 
the nearest lineal ancestors and their descendants, the descendants collectively 
taking the share of their immediate ancestors, in equal parts. 
In 1975, the language following "then to" was changed to read "the nearest lineal ancestor 
and their issue, the issue taking equally if they are all of the same degree of kinship to 
the decedent, but if of unequal degree, then those of more remote degree take by represen­
tation." Although this formulation is not free of difficulty, it avoids the problems of the 
original enactment. Unfortunately, however, the grotesque language of the original Colo­
rado provision has been reborn in the New Mexico enactment. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 
32A-2-103E (Spec. Uniform Prob. Code Pamphlet 1975). 
56. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-109 (1973); MoNT. REv. ConEs ANN. § 91A-2-109 
(Spec. Uniform Prob. Code Pamphlet 1975). 
57. See In re Kay's Estate, 127 Mont. 172, 180-81, 260 P.2d 391, 395 (1953). 
58. For an interesting if, in parts, somewhat dated discussion of the status of adopted 
children under the traditional laws of intestate succession see Kuhlmann, Intestate Suc­
cession By and From the Adopted Child, 28 WASH. U.L.Q. 221 (1943); Fairley, Inheritance 
Rights Consequent to Adoptions, 29 N.C.L. REv. 227 (1951). 
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the resulting revelations may have painful and unpredictable ef­
fects. Apart from emotional shock, the adopted child stands to 
gain little from being associated with an estate of his natural 
parents or kindred since it is probable that he will be disinherited 
unless he successfully contests the will. 
Colorado's change in section 2-109 anticipated an amend­
ment made to the Code in 1975. When an illegitimate seeks to 
establish paternity after the death of the alleged father, Colorado 
requires merely that such paternity be established by a "prepon­
derance of evidence. " 59 This standard of proof is substantially 
lower than the pre-1975 UPC requirement of "clear and convinc­
ing proof."60 Arguably, this modification will increase the possi­
bility of spurious suits and reduce the protection offered to the 
acknowledged devisees of the decedent. The Colorado deviation 
is understandable, however, in light of the concern expressed in 
the late 60's and early 70's for the rights of illegitimates. 61 Both 
the Colorado statute and the modification of UPC section 2-109 
are in alignment with the National Conference's current 
position,62 which reflects increasing recognition of illegitimates' 
rights. 
E. Section 2-112: Alienage 
Section 2-112 rejects the ancient rule that an alien may not 
inherit or transmit realty by descent.63 In fundamental opposi­
tion, Nebraska and Montana have modified the language of this 
section to limit the right of aliens to receive realty by devise.64 
Nebraska places various restrictions on alien land ownership.65 
Montana, before permitting an alien to inherit realty, requires 
59. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-109(i)(b)(II) (1973). 
60. UPC § 2-109(2)(ii). 
61. See H. KRAUSE, Iu.EGITIMACY: LAW AND SociAL PoLICY (1971); Krause, Bringing the 
Bastard Into the Great Society-A Proposed Uniform Act on Legitimacy, 44 TEXAS L. REv. 
829, 854-56 (1966). One product of the concern for illegitimates was the Uniform Parentage 
Act, which recommended elimination of statutory discrimination that works to the disad­
vantage of persons born out of wedlock. 1973 HANDBOOK OF THE NAT'L CoNFERENCE OF 
CoMM'Rs ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 335. 
62. AMENDMENTS TO THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE [in 1975 NAT'L CONFERENCE OF 
· CoMM'Rs oN UNIFORM STATE LAws 2]. 
63. See ATKINSON 53-54, 93-95. The disability never was applied to personalty in the 
United States. UPC § 2-112, Comment; ATKINSON 93. Most states, before the UPC, had 
removed this restriction as to land as well. ld. 
64. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2312 (Cum. Supp. 1974); MoNT. REv. CoDES ANN. § 91A-2­
111 (Spec. Uniform Prob. Code Pamphlet 1975). 
65. NEB. ~EV. STAT. § 30-2312 (Cum. Supp. 1974); id. §§ 76-401 et seq. (1971). 
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that the alien's homeland reciprocate in providing for land inheri­
tance by aliens. 66 
Although the point involves a matter of state policy that 
overrides testamentary intention, there are two reasons why the 
Code position regarding alienage is preferable to that taken by 
Nebraska and Montana. First, the policy underlying the restric­
tion of land ownership by aliens is no longer relevant. This dis­
ability, which arose in medieval England, where land was bur­
dened with feudal obligations and duties that were incompatible 
with foreign ownership, 67 has ·since been abandoned in modern 
Britain. 68 
Second, the Nebraska-Montana provisions are arguably un­
constitutional in light of Zschernig v. Miller. 69 In that case, the 
United States Supreme Court struck down an Oregon statute 
that provided for escheat when a nonresident alien heir failed to 
show that his nation afforded Americans reciprocal inheritance 
rights. The Court reasoned that the statute marked an unconsti­
tutional intrusion by the state into tnatters involving United 
States foreign policy, a realm reserved exclusively to the federal 
government. 
F. Section 2-301: Omitted Spouse 
Section 2-301 deals with the spouse who is omitted through 
oversight from the decedent's will. Complementing the elective 
share remedy described in section 2-201, et seq., the statutory 
provision for a pretermitted spouse is available only in cases 
where the decedent has not demonstrated that the omission was 
deliberate. The Code allows use of statements from the dece­
dent's will and evidence concerning non probate transfers to dem­
onstrate an intention to omit the spouse from the will.70 It reflects 
the position that a fiat prohibition against the admission of ex­
trinsic evidence is unnecessary and undesirable when weighed 
against the policy of giving effect to the plan of a decedent who 
may have had good reason to omit the spouse, including, pos­
sibly, that ample provision had already been made for her. 
Only Nebraska has substantially altered the language of sec­
66. MoNT. REv. ConEs ANN.§ 91A-2-111 (Spec. Uniform Prob. Code Pamphlet 1975). 
67. O'Connell & EfHand, Intestate Succession and Wills: A Comparative Analysis of 
the Law of Arizona and the Uniform Probate Code, 14 ARIZ. L. REv. 205, 221 (1972). 
68. British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act of 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 17, § 17. 
69. 389 u.s. 429 (1968). 
70. UPC § 2-301(a). 
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tion 2-301. Its statute gives the omitted spouse a normal intestate 
share regardless of the testator's intention, unless the spouse 
waives this right by written statement.71 The Nebraska provision, 
less flexible than the more comprehensive Code language, admit­
tedly achieves definiteness. But although the Code risks some 
uncertainty, it is preferable to a rule that results in unintended 
benefits for the spouse and unnecessary contradiction of the will. 
The practical effect of the Nebraska version of the section, like 
that of the old rule that marriage revokes a will, 72 is to force 
testators to re-execute their wills after marriage without regard 
for whether the marriage was anticipated in the will, or whether 
ample provision from nonprobate assets was made for the pro­
spective spouse. 73 It is submitted that this position is overly 
mechanical, unnecessary, and likely to cause hardships for the 
families of persons who remarry late in life. 
G. Section 2-302: Pretermitted Children 
Section 2-302 basically protects pretermitted children by giv­
ing them a share of the estate equal to what they would have 
taken had the decedent died intestate. This section was designed 
to improve on existing pretermission patterns that create signifi­
cant advantages for a child born after execution of a will not 
providing for then living children, and exclude consideration of 
nonprobate gifts to the afterborn child.74 Section 2-302 also per­
mits relief in cases where a living child is omitted from a will 
solely because testator mistakenly believes the child is dead. 
Two adopting states, Nebraska and Utah, have modified the 
language of this section. 75 In place of the language of section 2­
71. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30~2320 (Cum-. Supp. 1974). See id. § 30-2320; UPC § 2-204. 
72. Revocations of this type are provided for today in many jurisdictions. ATKINSON 
424-27. 
73. The Nebraska legislature apparently prefers the surviving spouse over pretermit­
ted children. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2321 (Cum. Supp. 1974) provides that the share of a 
pretermitted child is defeated when "it appears from the will that the omission was 
intentional." This is part of the language that was dropped from § 30-2320 dealing with 
the omitted spouse. 
74. These advantages exist since pretermitted children who were born after execution 
of the will are generally given statutory protection without examining the testator's possi­
ble intentional omission-either because of a desire to disinherit the children or because 
substantially all of the estate was devised to the other parent-or considering non probate 
gifts to the afterborn child. In contrast, while UPC § 2-302 protects pretermitted children, 
it also allows inquiry into whether the testator intentionally omitted the child and takes 
into consideration nonprobate transfers by the decedent to the child with the intent that 
they be in lieu of a testamentary transfer. 
75. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2321 (Cum. Supp. 1974); UTAH CooE ANN.§ 75-2-302 (Spec. 
Supp. 1975). 
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302(3) that permits parole evidence to determine the testator's 
intent to omit a child, Nebraska has substituted a mechanical 
test by which any nonprobate transfer to an afterborn child "in 
any amount equal to or greater than that child's share had the 
testator died intestate" defeats that child's right to an intestate 
share.76 This change reflects the same suspicion toward the use 
of parole evidence in testamentary matters that underlies N e­
braska's changes in section 2-301;77 hence, the testator's intention 
under section 2-302 becomes irrelevant. 
Besides ignoring the decedent's intention, the Nebraska pro­
vision creates numerous additional problems and uncertainties. 
For example, the provision fails to indicate whether the approxi­
mation in value to an heir's share in intestacy is to be made at 
the time of the inter vivos transfer or at death. In addition, it 
seems anomalous for the afterborn child's rights to depend in part 
on whether he has received nonprobate gifts when the pre-born 
child's rights are determined without regard to nonprobate gifts. 
Finally, the relationship of the provision to section 2-612, dealing 
with ademption by satisfaction, is not clear. The Nebraska 
draftsmen seem to have rejected consideration of the decedent's 
intention in preference for a legal nightmare. 
The Utah deviation, on the other hand, although it permits 
use of extrinsic evidence to show that the omission of a child from 
a will was intentional, includes "any of [the testator's] children" 
as takers where omitted through oversight.78 It does not limit the 
protection to children "born or adopted after the execution of the 
will," as does the Code. Utah's change ignores the entire context 
of the pretermission problem and moves toward contradiction of 
the premise that a testator's intention to disinherit his children 
is legally effective. Pretermission is basically a "time gap" prob­
lem, created because a will, although executed perhaps years 
before the event, speaks only at the testator's death. Section 2­
302 is designed, as is section 2-301, to support testamentary in­
tention by mitigating the effects of unintentional disinheritance. 
When a living child is omitted from a will, however, it is probable 
that the omission was intentional. By forcing the testator to ex­
plain what may be perfectly obvious when his words are read in 
the context of surrounding circumstances, the Utah deviation 
transforms section 2-301 into a provision that tends to prevent 
76. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2321 (Cum. Supp. 1974). 
77. See text accompanying note 71 supra. 
78. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 75-2-302 (Spec. Supp. 1975). 
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intentional disinheritance. 
Even worse, Utah extends the protection of the section to 
cases where the mention of issue of any deceased child is omitted 
from a will. This extension increases the section's potential for 
causing mischief, since testators may have many good reasons for 
declining to provide for grandchildren by a deceased child. It is 
odd and therefore legislatively unreasonable to expect that these 
reasons will appear from the language of the will. 
Utah's deviations from section 2-301 reflect prior Utah law,79 
under which there was a rebuttable presumption that failure to 
provide for children or a deceased child's issue was uninten­
tional.80 Utah's prior rule, however, called for an examination of 
the testator's intention respecting these omissions independently 
of the presumption.81 Unfortunately, under the new UPC lan­
guage retained in the Utah enactment, proof of intentional omis­
sion may be more limited than previously, since the UPC tests 
were designed to placate lawyers who are squeamish about use of 
extrinsic evidence regarding a decedent's intention. 
H. Section 2-401: Homestead Allowance 
Many states exempt homestead land from the claims of un­
secured creditors of either the husband or wife in order to provide 
some assurance that the family home will not be lost in times of 
economic distress. Also, upon a landowner's death, the typical 
homestead exemption is available to his surviving spouse and 
minor and dependent children. The statutes that create this ex­
emption vary greatly in the amount, kind, and value of land 
described.82 To avoid the somewhat capricious results that can 
occur under traditional provisions, since many modern families, 
probably including the most necessitous, do not own land, the 
UPC draftsmen substituted a suggested $5,000 allowance that 
may be satisfied in kind for traditional homestead patterns. 83 In 
keeping with its antecedents, this amount is exempted for the 
benefit of a spouse or minor children of the decedent from unse­
cured claims against the estate and takes precedence over the 
terms of any will. Utah, Colorado, North Dakota, Montana, Ari­
79. UTAH ConE ANN. § 74-1-32 (1953). 
80. In re Atwood's Estate, 14 Utah 1, 45 P. 1036 (1896). 
81. In re Newell's Estate, 78 Utah 463, 483-92, 5 P.2d 230, 237-41 (1931). 
82. See ATKINSON 126-28. 
83. UPC § 2-401. 
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zona, and South Dakota did not accept section 2-401 as recom­
mended. 
Utah did not enact UPC section 2-401 at all. Instead, its 
statute incorporates a limited exemption along traditionallines.84 
Coupled with a distressing Utah change regarding the family sup­
port allowance, discussed later, 85 the exemption package in l_!tah 
falls seriously short, in values and ease of payment, of the Code 
recommendations. Inasmuch as the exemption package is of criti­
cal importance in speeding the administration of small estates 
involving a surviving spouse or dependent children, the devia­
tions seriously jeopardize the chances that Utah citizens will de­
rive any noticeable benefit from the new code. 
Colorado's version of the Code simply omits any mention of 
homestead or homestead allowance.86 The North Dakota87 and 
Montana88 versions also reject the Code homestead concept in 
favor of retaining the conventional landowner's homestead ex­
emption. The Montana provision is singularly unsatisfactory 
since it includes a new provision that purports to require every 
personal representative of a married decedent, upon his appoint­
ment, to file a homestead declaration for the decedent. 89 Thus, 
the Montana statutory system appears to require the personal 
representative to destroy the decedent's plan by claiming a home­
stead exemption without regard to the amount of the decedent's 
debts or the terms of the will. Some answer to this nonsense 
surely will be worked out in practice if not by amendment. 
In their respective versions of UPC section 2-401, Arizona90 
84. UTAH ConE ANN. § 75-2-401 (Spec. Supp. 1975) (providing the same homestead 
allowance as § 28-1-1). 
85. Note 106 and accompanying text infra. 
86. Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-41-211 (1973) describes a homestead exemption of 
$15,000 which is explicitly made available to a surviving spouse and minor children so long 
as occupancy of the homestead continues. This exemption is in addition to exemptions 
and allowances provided in the probate code. 
87. N.D. CENT. ConE§ 30.1-07-01 {Spec. Uniform Prob. Code Supp. 1975) (refers to 
N.D. CENT. ConE § 47-18-01 (1960) for definition of homestead). 
88. MoNT. REv. ConEs ANN. § 91A-2-401 {Spec. Uniform Prob. Code Pamphlet 1975). 
Montana's traditional homestead exemption is established and defined in MoNT. REv. 
ConEs ANN. §§ 33-101 to -129 (1961). Section 33-129 would have been especially damaging 
to the UPC goal of providing adequate funds for the surviving spouse since it provided 
only for a life estate to the spouse with the remainder going to the children. Fortunately, 
the legislature recognized this problem and repealed § 33-129 in An Act to Generally 
Revise and Repeal Statutes on Wills, Succession, Probate and Guardianship to Conform 
Montana Law to the Uniform Probate Code ch. 263, § 15, [1975] Mont. Laws 510. 
89. MoNT. REv. ConEs ANN. § 91A-2-401(2) (Spec. Uniform Prob. Code Pamphlet 
1975). 
90. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2401 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974). 
376 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1976: 
and South Dakota91 narrowed the homestead exemption with re­
gard to children. Under the Code, if there is no surviving spouse, 
each minor and each dependent child is entitled to a share of the 
homestead allowance. In Arizona and South Dakota, however, 
the legislation omits the language relating to minority, leaving 
the right to the exemption to be determined solely on the basis 
of dependency. Somewhat more regrettably, both enactments 
give expenses of administration precedence over the homestead 
exemption. 92 Lawyers who normally will be engaged by benefici­
aries of exemptions can protect themselves vis-a-vis fees; there is 
no sound reason why attorneys' fees should receive priority over 
family rights. 
I. Section 2-402: Exempt Property 
Section 2-402 was drafted for the purpose, inter alia, of re­
moving certain chattel property from the reach of creditors so 
that family members may retain items of sentimental or personal 
value that would bring little cash if sold to satisfy creditors' 
claims. The surviving spouse and children (without regard to 
dependency where no spouse survives) are entitled to an exemp­
tion in such property, in addition to the homestead allowance, of 
up to $3,500. The section also provides that if chattels of the 
designated value are not available, cash or any other asset may 
be exempted up to the maximum value of $3,500. This exemption 
is justified by a combination of factors, including the good sense 
of exempting small estates passing to close family survivors from 
creditors' claims and the delays of administration. Also, to the 
extent the provision serves to relieve fiduciaries of the necessity 
to administer household goods, automobiles, and other assets 
that are probably best left for disposal by family members, the 
exempt chattel provision makes the estate plan provided by law 
align with the pattern of well-drafted wills that include specific 
gifts of household effects. 
The UPC extension of the section 2-402 exemption to nonde­
pendent adult children is vulnerable to attack if the state, as a 
matter of policy, favors creditor protection over family conve­
nience. Arizona balked at this point, changing the exemption so 
that it is restricted to the spouse and dependent children.93 
91. S.D. UNIFORM PRoB. ConE § 2-401 (1975). 
92. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-2401 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974); S.D. UNIFORM PROB. 
ConE § 2-401 (1975). UPC § 2-401 exempts the homestead allowance from all claims 
against the estate and gives the allowance priority over all claims. 
93. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-2402 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974). 
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Colorado has increased the amount of the exempt property 
allowance to $7,500, converted it into a straight money allowance, 
and restricted it to the spouse, children under 21, and dependent 
children94 of the decedent. 
The Utah change in section 2-402 is unfortunate and unnec­
essary. It provides that reasonable funeral expenses have priority 
over the allowance provided by this section.95 Perhaps the provi­
sion is attributable to lobbyists; more probably, it is the result of 
unconsidered and unfortunate attachment to former Utah law.96 
When probate was a formal, lengthy process, it was necessary to 
allow payment of the burial expenses as a priority item so that 
the funeral home would not have to wait through the slow probate 
process before being paid. The UPC, however, facilitates prompt 
payment of claims, particularly those like the funeral bill that 
have priority over the decedent's unsecured general creditors. 
The most obvious effect of a provision like Utah's that puts fu­
neral expenses ahead of beneficiaries of family exemptions is to 
delay and possibly jeopardize quick distribution of needed funds 
to the surviving spouse. 
The spouse would be at least as likely a source of quick 
payment of the funeral bill as an estate fiduciary, who might feel 
restricted by concern about his ability to prove the propriety of 
every estate act. Since it is the spouse who normally will make 
funeral arrangements, a clear understanding with the funeral 
director that the bill will be paid as soon as the spouse receives 
estate assets might better serve to facilitate prompt payment. 
Once Utah funeral directors realize that under the UPC the pro­
bate judge is no longer a sort of general supervisor of estates who 
can aid them in bill collection proble!Ils, they may agree to new 
legislation that would give family exemptions the full priority 
intended by the UPC. 
J. Section 2-403: Family Allowance 
Section 2-403 provides for the payment of a reasonable allow­
ance for the maintenance of the decedent's immediate family 
during administration of his estate. It is primarily the need for 
immediate income by the family that justifies taking the amount 
94. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-402 (Cum. Supp. 1975). 
95. UTAH ConE ANN. § 75-2-402 (Spec. Supp. 1975). 
96. ld. § 75-9-21 (1953); Columbia Trust Co. v. Anglum, 63 Utah 353, 225 P. 1089 
(1924). 
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of this allowance away from the creditors and the control of any 
will. 
After debate, the draftsmen determined that this allowance 
should be made a terminable interest even though it would not 
qualify for inclusion in the federal estate tax marital deduction 
share of the,surviving spouse .. Their first concern was to make this 
characteristic clear so that executors would not face unnecessary 
complexities in applying marital deduction formula clauses. The 
decision to place the allowance in the terminable interest cate­
gory despite potential estate tax disadvantages was based on the 
belief that state law exemptions should not be influenced by tax 
considerations that will be relevant in relatively few estates.97 
To date, Nebraska, Arizona, and Utah have changed this 
section. The Nebraska deviation from the Code attempts to make 
this allowance, when payable to the surviving spouse, nontermin­
able.98 Thus, it appears that either the considerations discussed 
above were overlooked, or they were subordinated to a seldom 
realized estate tax advantage. The small potential tax advantage 
gained by the change certainly does not warrant deviation from 
the carefully considered reasons behind making the allowance 
terminable. 
Arizona and Utah have each made a significant change in 
section 2-403 consistent with their own changes made in preced­
ing sections of Part 4. Arizona put administration expenses ahead 
of the family allowance;99 Utah put funeral expenses before this 
allowance. 10°Criticisms of the same changes to related exemption 
sections are equally valid with regard to the alterations in section 
2-403. 101 
K. Section 2-404: Source, Determination, 
and Documentation 
Section 2-404 allows beneficiaries to select property for the 
homestead allowance of section 2-401 and for the exemption 
under section 4-402, subject to the restriction that specific devises 
to others may not be disturbed except in cases of necessity. 102 If 
97. This tax consideration affects only a small percentage of estates since only a small 
percentage of estates are large enough to be concerned with the marital deduction. 
98. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2324 (Cum. Supp. 1974). 
99. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-2403 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974). 
100. UTAH ConE ANN. § 75-2-403 (Spec. Supp. 1975). 
101. See text accompanying notes 93, 95 supra. 
102. UPC § 2-404 is consistent with UPC § 3-906, establishing a preference for distri­
bution in kind, and UPC §§ 3-709, 3-715(27), and 3-907, which provide guidelines for all 
distributions. 
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the beneficiaries of these exemptions fail to make their selections 
within a reasonable time, the personal representative may do so 
in behalf of the beneficiaries. The personal representative also 
determines the amount of the family allowance within the bounds 
set by the Code. 103 Review of the personal representative's deci­
sion is available to any interested person who petitions the court. 
Three states modified this section: South Dakota, Nebraska, 
and Utah. 104 Curiously, South Dakota excludes nondependent 
adult children from the rights outlined in the section, 105 thereby 
causing a procedural rule to contradict the substantive rule in 
that state's section 2-402, which gives adult children rights in 
exempt property. 
The Utah change in section 2-404 is one of the most damag­
ing of any made to article IT. By inserting a requirement that the 
personal representative pay the family allowance only "after no­
tice to all interested parties and approval by the court," 106 Utah 
has contradicted the Code's premise that probate matters should 
be handled like other business and brought to court only when a 
dispute arises among interested persons. Utah's deviation will 
also frustrate a major policy of the UPC to permit small estates 
to be distributed quickly and without undue risk to personal rep­
resentatives. With respect to larger estates, the change frustrates 
the UPC effort to allow a sizeable "nest egg" to be released rap­
idly and easily to the surviving spouse. 
The Utah revision is especially damaging since the added 
delay and expense accomplish nothing. With or without the 
change, creditors and other interested persons are protected by all 
of the Code safeguards, including the provisions relating to per­
sonal representatives, the limitation in amount of the allowances 
themselves, and the provisions in section 2-404 that allow contest 
of the selection, determination, or payment of the allowance by 
the personal representative. 107 
The Nebraska change provides that the personal representa­
103. The personal representative may award up to $500 per month for up to 1 year 
or up to $6,000 in a lump sum without court order. Upon petition by an aggrieved party, 
the court has the power to increase the award. 
104. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2325 (Cum. Supp. 1974); S.D. UNIFORM PRos. ConE § 2­
404 (1975); UTAH ConE ANN. § 75-2-404 (Spec. Supp. 1975). Arizona made some changes 
in this section to bring it into conformity with that state's community property approach, 
but those are not significant enough to warrant discussion here. 
105. See S.D. UNIFORM PRos. ConE § 2-404 (1975). 
106. UTAH ConE ANN. § 75-2-404 (Spec. Supp. 1975). 
107. See Kelley, Defensive Remedies Under the Uniform Probate Code, UPC NoTEs 
No. 12 (June 1975). 
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tive can be ordered to give "such notice as the court may require 
in a proceeding initiated under . . . section 30-2405" before mak­
ing selections of property to satisfy the allowance. 108 This lan­
guage might be interpreted to require what amounts to a formal 
proceeding as a precondition to distribution in kind of allowances, 
even though the state legislature states that the "insertion of this 
provision is not intended to imply that there should be a court 
order except in unusual circumstances."109 Still, if the section is· 
construed in the way the Nebraska draftsmen suggest, it adds 
nothing to the official text since section 2-404 already provides for 
court review of the personal representative's discretion whenever 
an interested person invokes the court's jurisdiction under section 
3-105. The provision appears to have been inserted to invite the 
use of formal proceedings in relation to allowances. As experience 
with independent administration develops, it is hoped that the 
invitation will be ignored. 
L. Section 2-502: Execution 
Section 2-502 requires wills to meet minimal execution for­
malities. A signature by or for the testator and the signatures of 
two witnesses are required. The usual strict requirement that 
witnesses sign the will in the testator's presence is eliminated. 
Also eliminated are the requirements that the witnesses act to­
gether and that they witness the testator's signature. It is enough 
that the witnesses hear an acknowledgement by the testator of his 
signature or his statement that the instrument is his will. Finally, 
oral wills are omitted from the UPC. 
The stated policy of the Code with regard to the execution 
of wills is to reduce the formalities required for execution of a 
witnessed will to a minimum. 110 This policy coordinates with oth­
ers that are designed to make the will more popular. In a society 
where mere signatures on checks and credit transactions can 
transfer unlimited sums of money, where deeds of land may be 
witnessed by persons who sign out of the presence of the grantor, 
and where revocable trusts of personalty which control vast es­
tates may be established without the aid of any witness, there is 
no justification for a rule that invalidates a will witnessed by 
persons who happen to sign out of the testator's presence. 
108. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2325 (Cum. Supp. 1974). 
109. ld. § 30-2325, Comment. 
110. UPC § 2-502, Comment. 
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Utah retains the requirement that witnesses sign the will in 
the testator's presence and in the presence of each otherY1 The 
word "presence" has proved troublesome, 112 as is evident from the 
large number of cases interpreting it. 113 The perpetuation of this 
requirement, with all of its refinements as appended by the cases, 
strikes directly at the policy behind the Code section. Certainly 
enough formality is kept by the Code to solemnize the execution 
of a will without maintaining esoteric rituals for their own sake. 
Oral wills were omitted from the UPC since they are gener­
ally disapproved. Courts have often declared their distaste for 
such wills, 114 and commentators have attacked them as outdated, 
of "inferior dignity," and subject to the usual problems of proof 
where only oral evidence of a deceased person's intention is avail­
able.ll5 The generally disfavored position of oral wills and the 
simplicity of UPC formalities involved in the execution of a will, 
including section 2-503, which permits holographic wills, militate 
against a provision permitting oral wills. 
Alaska has changed this provision to allow continued recog­
nition of oral wills made by mariners and soldiers in the state. 116 
Perhaps Alaska, as a frontier state, apprehends some special need 
for oral wills. Even so, it would seem that those needing to use 
oral wills would include more than merely mariners and soldiers. 
M. Section 2-503: Holographic Will 
Section 2-503 provides for recognition of holographic wills. 
South Dakota, Utah, and Nebraska all have added provisions 
that affect the validity of such wills. 
South Dakota's version of section 2-503 adds to the recom­
mended Code provision the requirement that a holographic will 
be dated to be valid, but then tacks on a section numbered 2­
503A, which states that "failure to have dated a will does not 
affect its validity ... [!]"117 It is difficult to know what to make 
111. UTAH ConE ANN. § 75-2-502 (Spec. Supp. 1975). 
112. For discussion of existing law and an indication of how ripe this area of the law 
is for simplifying reform see Comment, Attestation of Wills-An Examination of Some 
Problem Areas, 11 S. TEx. L.J. 125 (1969). For an example of how complex and variable 
interpretation of traditional execution requirements has become see Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 
318 (1961) (dealing with the "presence" requirement only). 
113. See, e.g., In re Thurman's Estate, 13 Utah 2d 156, 369 P.2d 925 (1962); In re 
Alexander's Estate, 104 Utah 286, 139 P.2d 432 (1943). 
114. ATKINSON 367. 
115. Id. 
116. ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.155 (1972). 
117. S.D. UNIFORM PRos. ConE§§ 2-503, -503A (1974). 
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of this legislation. 
The Utah section adds a provision indicating that the ab­
sence of a date on a holographic will invalidates the instrument 
under certain circumstances, e.g., when there are several conflict­
ing holographic wills and no "circumstances ... that establish 
which will was last executed. " 118 Although this is clearly better 
than a rigid requirement that a holograph be dated, the provision 
is superfluous. Nothing has been added to the general rule that a 
will may be too indefinite to be given effect. 
Utah adds an additional provision to section 2-503, requiring 
that "the provisions" of the holographic will be in the testator's 
handwriting, in contrast to the Code's requirement that only its 
"material provisions" be in the testator's handwriting} 19 This 
raises the spectre of possible invalidation of holographs that are 
not "entirely" in the testator's hand, as in the case of holographs 
on will forms, because one or more words on the paper are 
printed. The draftsmen of the official text sought to support the 
testator's intention whenever possible. The Utah committees evi­
dently favored a rule that. tends to subject homemade wills to an 
unreasonable, technical trap. . 
Nebraska presents the least justifiable alteration of this-sec­
tion. Its statute simply adds dating to the other requisites for 
validity of holographs. 120 Lack of a date on a will may cause prob­
lems, but not necessarily; the date may be irrelevant, or other 
evidence of the will's probable date may exist. In any event, there 
is no reason to impose a different dating requirement on holo­
graphic wills than other forms of wills. The change reflects the 
bias of lawyers against homemade wills and departs from the 
UPC policy of moving probate law closer to the desires of the 
public. 
N. Section 2-505: Who May Witness 
Section 2-505 provides that a beneficiary may be a witness 
118. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 75-2-503 (Spec. Supp. 1975). 
119. Compare UTAH CoDE ANN. § 75-2-503 (Spec. Supp. 1975) with UPC § 2-503. The 
UPC language leaves the determination of what constitutes material provisions in each 
case to the courts. The thrust of this section is to overrule those cases that have strictly 
construed statutes which require the will to be entirely in the testator's handwriting. Such 
constructions have resulted in the destruction of a testator's plan because of a typewritten 
date, preamble, or other insubstantial departure from the statute. The handwritten char­
acter of the material provisions and the signature combine to assure reliability against 
fraud sufficiently to allow unimportant deviations in nonmaterial elements. See UPC § 
2-503, Comment. 
120. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2328 (Cum. Supp. 1974). 
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without invalidating the will or disqualifying himself from taking 
his full bequest. This is a departure from the ancient rule disqual­
ifying "interested witnesses." 
Disqualification of the interested witness dates from the time 
of the passage of the Statute of Frauds in England. At that time, 
no one interested in a lawsuit was competent to testify in it. 121 It 
followed that anyone who had an interest under a will was incom­
petent to testify concerning its execution ..With no competent 
witnesses to prove its execution, the will failed. Although modern 
law no longer disqualifies interested witnesses completely, most 
state laws continue to discriminate against these witnesses in 
some manner. Nearly all states now have rules that save the will 
but expunge the witness of the taint of interest by voiding or 
limiting his bequest. 122 
The UPC position is based on a realization that the rule 
disqualifying witnesses or forfeiting devises to them only penal­
izes persons (including the testator, whose wishes are contra­
dicted in part) who were ignorant, either that the testator in­
cluded a provision for them, or of the rule that denies them their 
legacy. Professional will draftsmen would not use beneficiaries of 
the will as witnesses in any event, since the suggestion of undue 
influence would invite contest. This means that in practice the 
rule likely applies only to cases involving homemade wills and to 
testators who turned to those closest to them, often persons who 
would be expected to be named as beneficiaries, for assistance in 
completing their wills. UPC draftsmen concluded that these typi­
cal circumstances do not support what amounts to a conclusive 
presumption of undue influence. Indeed, persons who unduly per­
suade testators to make wills in their favor may be less likely than 
innocent persons to want their names to appear as witnesses on 
their handiwork. 123 The only meaningful protection against undue 
influence is the ability to contest a will when the evidence war­
rants. The UPC position is that this approach is more satisfactory 
for cases involving devises to witnesses than one that predictably 
draws legal lightning bolts down upon innocent and intended will 
beneficiaries. 124 
Nebraska, Utah, and Montana have substantially altered 
121. ATKINSON 312. 
122. See Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 1256 (1964). 
123. UPC § 2-505, Comment. 
124. Many commentators have been critical of the "interested witness" rule. See, 
e.g., Gulliver & Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1, 11-13 (1941) 
(excoriating the rule as a harsh measure to solve merely a "hypothetical" problem). 
384 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1976: 
this section. Nebraska allows an "interested witness" to receive 
a bequest up to, but not exceeding, the share he would have 
received had the testator died intestate. 125 If there is at least one 
disinterested witness to the will, however, the witness-devisee 
takes his full devise. Montana and Utah accepted the narrower 
and more traditional pattern that limits the portion an interested 
witness may take to the lesser of his testate or intestate share. 126 
Although none of these deviations from the Code invalidate the 
entire will (as did early English law), they are still substantially 
out of step with the Code provisions. Since there is no good reason 
for deviation on this point, the Nebraska, Utah, and Montana 
versions of section 2-505 serve as a sad monument to the predilec­
tion of lawyers, who serve as legislative draftsmen or critics of 
proposed legislation, to adhere to old formulations of law that 
lack modern justification. 
0. Section 2-507: Revocation by Writing or by Act 
Section 2-507 gives familiar latitude to a testator to revoke 
his will, in whole or in part, by express writing, implication, or 
act. The breadth of this provision is consistent with the Code's 
policy of giving effect to a decedent's intention whenever possible. 
All but Colorado have accepted the UPC version of this section. 
By restructuring section 2-507 so as to omit any mention of 
partial revocation by act, Colorado effected a construction of the 
section that will always work to defeat a testator's intention. 127 
Admittedly, unexecuted markings on wills cause numerous prob­
lems. But forbidding partial revocation by act has had little tend­
ency to prevent or correct these problems. While testators who 
leave ambiguous marks on their wills may be presumed to be ill­
advised, it is not practical to try to prevent this ill-advised con­
duct or just to deny all effect to revealed intent. Hence, the only 
satisfactory position for the law is to effectuate the testator's 
intention to the extent possible. Surely this is preferable to the 
absurdity of denying effect to an attempted act of partial revoca­
tion where the unrevoked portion of the will is readily ascertaina­
125. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2330 (Cum. Supp. 1974). 
126. MoNT. REv. ConEs ANN. § 91A-2-505 (Spec. Uniform Prob. Code Pamphlet 
1975); UTAH ConE ANN. § 75-2-505 (Spec. Supp. 1975). 
127. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-507(2) (1973). This change also raises some inter­
esting practical questions. What will be the effect of interlineations in the testator's 
handwriting? If initialed or signed, could they not be construed to be holographic codicils 
revoking inconsistent sections of the prior will? What is a "signature" for purposes of UPC 
§ 2-503? 
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ble while conceding, in cases of successful partial obliteration, 
that only what remains as intelligible may be given effect. Yet 
this result has been reached under statutes similar to Colo­
rado's.128 
P. Section 2-508: Revocation by Divorce; No Revocation by 

Other Changes of Circumstances 

Section 2-508 limits revocation by change of circumstance to 
divorce, which revokes the portion of the will in favor of the 
former spouse. Remarriage between the same persons revives the 
will's provisions if revoked only by section 2-508. 
Arizona129 and Utah130 added to the UPC by providing that 
divorce not only revokes testamentary provisions in favor of the 
ex-spouse, but also any in favor of the former spouse's issue who 
are not also issue of the testator. Although this change has super­
ficial appeal, many may quarrel with the implicit assump­
tion-that divorce usually ends all contact and emotional ties 
between the testator and issue of his ex-spouse-that justifies the 
conclusion that a testator would not continue to intend to provide 
for the ex-spouse's issue. In some circumstances, revocation of 
gifts to a spouse's issue because of divorce undoubtedly reflects 
intention, as in the case where a will provides for class gifts to the 
spouse's "issue" or "children" without naming them. But consid­
erable doubt would attend the revocation of gifts to a spouse's 
issue when the devise is to an individual by name and does not 
refer to the relationship between the devisee and the spouse. The 
rule becomes positively untenable where the relationship between 
the devisee and the testator antedates the marriage. 
It seems doubtful that other states will want to follow this 
deviation of Arizona and Utah, at least not without some qualify­
ing language. Even with qualifiers, the notion of extending revo­
cation by operation of law can be challenged as an unwise legisla­
tive venture into the motives of testators concerning their reasons 
for choosing the beneficiaries named in wills. After a testator dies, 
guesswork about why he wrote the will that he left unrevoked at 
death should be discouraged whenever possible. It is one thing to 
legislate that devises to ex-spouses are revoked by divorce, for 
there is no doubt that the relationship between the testator and 
128. See, e.g., Henry v. Fraser, 58 App. D.C. 260, 29 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1928); In re 
Johannes' Estate, 170 Kan. 407, 227 P.2d 148 (1951). 
129. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-2508 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974). 
130. UTAH ConE ANN. § 75-2-508 (Spec. Supp. 1975). 
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the devisee has changed. It is quite another matter to extend the 
assumption of changed relationship to persons who are not parties 
to the divorce. There is, therefore, a sound reason for limiting 
revocation by operation of law in divorce cases to the devise to 
the former spouse. 




Section 2-513 permits a testator to note in his will that he will 
designate the beneficiaries of various personal assets on a list that 
he has prepared or will prepare and leave to be found or identi­
fied, as described in the will. Although frequently encountered in 
practice, these lists were of doubtful validity under pre-Code 
rules, and of utility only in cases where survivors were willing to 
be guided by them. By validating these lists, the UPC provides 
for the testator who may want to change his specific bequests 
periodically, or who may wish to defer decision ab9ut chattel 
dispositions until after the execution of his will. This concession 
to testator's intent came into the Code because of the interests 
of lawyers and clients in avoiding the necessity of preparing a 
codicil whenever a client's whim changes concerning who should 
inherit treasured items of personal property. 
Nebraska changed section 2-513 to require that the outside 
writing be dated. 131 This change is consistent with the unfortun­
ate and unqualified requirement in that state that holographic 
wills be dated. 132 The addition of a date requirement for a section 
2-513 writing is even more dubious than the requirement of a date 
for a holographic will. It is irrelevant to the application of section 
2-513 whether the instrument referred to by the will was written 
before or after the execution of the will. If there is no uncertainty, 
such as in the case where only one document meets the descrip­
tion in the will, the outside list should not be made inoperative 
simply because that instrument happens to be undated. 
R. Section 2-605: Anti-lapse; Deceased Devisee; Class Gifts 
Section 2-605 prevents the lapse of devises to certain devi­
sees. Basically, if the testator makes a devise to a grandparent or 
a lineal descendant of a grandparent, unless otherwise indicated, 
the devise will not lapse by reason of the devisee's death if the 
131. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2338 (Cum. Supp. 1974). 
132. See text accompanying note 120 supra. 
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devisee leaves issue who survive the testator. 
Nebraska and Utah have both modified section 2-605 so that 
it applies to devises to any relative, rather than only to relatives 
who are descended from the testator's grandparents. 133 The 
change is consistent with the acceptance in these codes of the 
possibility of inheritance by very remote relatives. Still, it can be 
questioned whether testators who make devises to remote rela­
tives assume or intend that their gifts will pass to a deceased 
devisee's issue. In addition, earlier criticism of inheritance by 
remote relatives applies equally well here. 134 
S. Section 2-608: Nonademption of Specific Devises 
in Certain Cases 
Section 2-608 deals with three categories of ademption of 
specific devises. The first category deals with dispositions of spe­
cifically devised assets by a conservator. In these cases, if the 
testator is not restored to competency at least 1 year before death, 
the devisee is entitled to a general pecuniary devise in the amount 
of the net proceeds of the conservator's sale. This devise is to be 
made whether or not the proceeds of the disposition can be traced 
into the testator's estate or whether the conservator has received 
the sale proceeds. The second category deals narrowly with situa­
tions in which a testator's title to a specifically devised asset has 
been supplemented or replaced wholly or in part by the testator's 
right (a) to unpaid proceeds from a sale of the asset; (b) to an 
unpaid award in condemnation for a public taking of the asset; 
(c) to unpaid proceeds from fire or other casualty insurance cover­
ing a loss of the asset; or (d) to property owned as a result of 
foreclosure of a security interest in the specifically devised asset. 
In situations (a), (b), and (c), the devise is adeemed to the extent 
that the testator has received payment but not otherwise; it is 
irrelevant whether the proceeds remain in his· hands or can be 
traced into other assets he owns at death. In situation (d), the 
property received replaces the devise. The third and largest cate­
gory embraces all other instances in which some or all of a specifi­
cally devised asset is not owned by the testator at the time of his 
death. Section 2-608, by failing to provide nonademption, implic­
itly adopts the traditional view that such a devise is adeemed. 
Both Montana and Colorado changed this section, but lim­
133. NEB. REv. STAT.§ 30-2343 (Cum. Supp. 1974); UTAH CoDE ANN.§ 75-2-605 (Spec. 
Supp. 1975). 
134. See notes 51-52 and accompanying text supra. 
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ited their surgery to the portion dealing with sales by conserva­
tors. Montana narrowed the protection against ademption to in­
stances where the proceeds from the conservator's sale of the 
devised asset are owned by the testator at death, or can be traced 
into other assets then owned by him. 135 This variation follows a 
line developed in pre-Code decisions136 which the Code drafters 
rejected in favor of a California precedent137 that dispenses with 
tracing and gives the devisee a pecuniary devise in substitution 
for the specific devise of the thing sold. Tracing involves problems 
of proof for estate administrators that should be avoided wherever 
possible. The principal purpose of rules preventing ademption as 
the result of conservators' sales is to minimize the possibility that 
a testator's estate plan will be altered by his conservator. The rule 
adopted by the UPC is calculated to minimize the effects of a 
conservator's acts on a protected person's will without creating 
troublesome problems of proof. 138 
Colorado omits the language of section 2-608(a) that makes 
the subsection inapplicable when a testator who has been under 
a disability is adjudicated no longer disabled and survives the 
adjudication by 1 year. 139 The effect of the omitted Code language 
is to permit ademption when the testator is competent for the 
prescribed period, the assumption being that he would make an­
other provision for the devisee if he did not want the bequest 
adeemed. The Code premise is questionable, however, and the 
Colorado change seems desirable. About the only thing that can 
safely be assumed about a conservator's sale is that it does not 
necessarily involve the approval of the protected testator, and 
may, therefore, contravene his intentions. It is arbitrary to make 
any aspect of a testator's estate plan depend on whether he lived 
more than a year after the conservatorship ends when it is uncer­
tain, contrary to what the UPC drafters seem to have assumed, 
that the testator within the year would have reviewed and 
approved of the conservator's actions. The Code rightfully fol­
lowed a significant amount of authority in its position that a 
135. MoNT. REv. ConEs ANN. § 91A-2-608 (Spec. Uniform Prob. Code Pamphlet 
1975). 
136. See, e.g., Morse v. Converse, 80 N.H. 24, 113 A. 214 (1921). 
137. In re Mason's Estate, 62 Cal. 2d 213, 397 P.2d 1005, 42 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1965). 
138. It should be noted that a conservator under the Code is given standing to exam­
ine the will of the person whose affairs he is managing, and is directed to disturb the estate 
plan of the protected person as little as possible in carrying out his responsibilities as 
conservator. UPC §§ 2-901, 5-427. If these provisions have their intended effect, problems 
of ademption that arise because of conservators' sales should be rare. 
139. Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-608 (1973). 
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conservator's sale should not defeat the protected person's plan 
to benefit certain persons by devises of the assets sold. There is 
little to be said, however, for the Code's attempt to deal with 
cases where the disabled person regains control of his estate. The 
Colorado committees are therefore to be commended for changing 
this provision. 
T. Miscellaneous 
Several states made other significant changes that merit at­
tention. Idaho, by addition to section 2-501, allows emancipated 
minors, as well as persons over 18, to make a will. 140 This change 
may represent an improvement on the Code which, at best, leaves 
this point open and, at worst, will be read to exclude the possibil­
ity. Curiously, Idaho complicated matters by allowing only adults 
to make a self-proving will. 141 
Colorado made three additional changes that are notewor­
thy. First, Colorado requires that writings which are incorporated 
by reference into a will be filed in court. 142 This alteration appar­
ently follows the pre-Code law in Colorado that developed as 
probate judges attempted to compel production of all documents 
affecting a will's meaning for purposes of supervising estate ad­
ministrations. This practice," however, cuts against the Code's 
philosophy of reducing the court's role to that of settling disputes. 
Second, section 15-11-511 of the Colorado Code, the testamentary 
additions to trusts section, was changed to follow prior Colorado 
law allowing a testator to make testamentary additions to trusts 
created by the will of another person who dies within 6 months 
after the testator's death. This change seems unnecessary, how­
ever, since the Code's provision, section 2-512, permitting refer­
ence to facts of nontestamentary significance, would seem to 
cover the same point. Finally, Colorado's section 15-11-601 makes 
a change in section 2-104 that purports to abrogate the UPC's 
120-hour survivorship requirement when the state's simultaneous 
death act applies. This is an ill-considered change that should be 
ignored as meaningless. 143 
140. IDAHO ConE § 15-2-501 (Supp. 1975). 
141. Id. § 15-2-504. 
142. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-510 (1973). 
143. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-613 (1973) contains the simultaneous death provi­
sions, but provides that the section will not apply in "any . . . situation where provision 
is made for distribution of property different from the provisions of this section ...." 
Perhaps, therefore, the Colorado addendum to UPC § 2-104, providing that § 15-11-601 
is subject to the simultaneous death provisions of§ 15-11-613, will never apply. 
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Montana changed section 2-607, dealing with gifts of specific 
securities, to allow specific devisees of stock to receive additional 
stock acquired by the testator through exercise of a purchase 
option after execution of the will. 144 There is little reason to ex­
pand the number of shares described by a devise just because the 
testator bought more shares after executing the wilL Whether or 
not the acquisition of the additional shares results from purchase 
options arising from ownership of the devised stock, the testator 
will have expended new funds in the purchase, and it is quite 
uncertain whether he would want the new shares acquired to 
follow the original stock gift. 
Utah amended sections 2-110 and 2-612 on advancements 
and ademption by satisfaction}45 The requirement of both sec­
tions that they be evidenced by a contemporaneous writing was 
changed so that the execution of the writing need not coincide 
with the completion of the gift. This alteration is unfortunate 
because it obscures the focus of the section on the transferor's 
intention at the time the gift is made. A later writing may be 
evidence of a later intention, but not necessarily of that at the 
time the gift was made. The drafters deliberately restricted con­
sideration of intention under the statute to that at the time the 
gift was made to avoid the inevitable errors that would result if 
extrinsic- evidence of a testator's intentions any time after making 
of the gift could be brought forward to prove whether the gift was 
to be in lieu of a devise. 
III. CONCLUSION 
In order to facilitate the comparison of the nine enacted ver­
sions of article II reported here, the authors have prepared a chart 
of symbols indicating acceptance or rejection of UPC recommen­
dations for each of the 57 sections of article II. Arranged in col­
umns representing the first enacting states, the chart shows 513 
points of comparison between enactments of the Code to date and 
the original recommendations of the National Conference con­
cerning the substantive rules of inheritance. 
Only 4 7 sections of article II were examined by this article. 146 
144. MoNT. REv. CoDES ANN. § 91A-2-607 (Spec. Uniform Prob. Code Pamphlet 
1975). 
145. UTAH CoDE ANN. §§ 75-2-110, -612 (Spec. Supp. 1975). 
146. These 47 sections do not include material in§§ 2-113, 2-201 to 2-207, 2-801, and 
2-803, which deal with marital property rights, renunciation, and homicide by an heir. See 
discussion of deleted material in note 1 supra. 
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Of a possible 423 points of comparison, National Conference rec­
ommendations were accepted in 354 instances and rejected in 69 
others for an acceptance rate of 83.7%. Disregarding the compari­
sons for sections 2-401 through 2-404, describing family probate 
exemptions where local policy understandably may be more im­
portant than concern for uniform rules supporting or reflecting 
decedents' intentions, the total number of points of comparison 
is reduced to 387, with 335 acceptances, for a rate of 86.6%. 
In addition to this rather encouraging rate of acceptance of 
uniform rules, advocates of simplicity in state inheritance laws 
can take heart from the fact that virtually all of the legislated 
deviations from the recommendations of article II fall into one of 
two categories, neither of which should deter or detract from 
ongoing efforts to win additional enactments of the Code. The 
first category includes changes that obstruct, rather than regu­
late, interpret, or presume, a decedent's intention as expressed in 
his will. Since all states decline, except in a small percentage of 
situations, to obstruct a testator's intentions, nonuniformity of 
law regarding testamentary obstructions can be tolerated without 
significant loss to the goals of modernizing and simplifying inheri­
tance rules through uniformity. 
The second category, including most of the changes that are 
explored in detail in this article, consists of deviations from the 
uniform law that are arbitrary and unsatisfactory when weighed 
against the arguments for adhering to Code recommendations. 
Legislators in states that have yet to enact the Code can be as­
sured that, almost without exception, the changes made by the 
enacting state do not improve on the Code. Except for a provision 
in section 2-608 dealing with the effect of a conservator's sale of 
a specifically devised asset, where the official text of the Code is 
patently questionable, the decisions of the National Co11ference 
and the language of the official text of the Code are preferable to 
the local deviations. 
Once it is accepted that all inheritance rules (save those 
obstructing testamentary freedom) should be designed for the 
convenience of testators rather than for the comfort and economic 
well-being of probate courts and various echelons and degrees of 
public and private probate specialists, uniformity of inheritance 
rules becomes an obviously desirable goal in this country of many 
states and mobile millions. When it is further perceived that the 
Uniform Probate Code is a sound and tested set of recommenda­
tions leading to this goal, the only remaining question for legisla­
tors is simply whether the vote should be cast for or against the 
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simplification that is obviously desired by most nonprofessionals. 
Despite the fact that nonprofessionals vastly outnumber the pro­
fessionals, however, the professionals have overwhelming advan­
tages of expertise, interest, time for debate, and history on their 
side. The principal hope for the public, therefore, is that the 
Uniform Probate Code may gain enough visibility and momen­
tum to carry the day. 
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APPENDIX 
Summary of Deviations From Article II by the First Nine Enactments 
KEv.-S = substantially unchanged; 0 =.omitted; X = substantial change 
UPC § Idaho AlaskaN. Dakota Arizona Colorado S. Dakota Montana Nebraska Utah 
2-101 s s s s s s s s s 
2-102 s s s X X X X X X 
2-103 s s s X X s X X X 
2-104 s s s s X s s s s 
2-105 s s s s s s s s s 
2-106 s s s s s s s s X 
2-107 s s s s s s s s s 
2-108 s s s s s s s s s 
2-109 s s s s X s X s s 
2-110 s s s s s s s s X 
2-111 s s s s s s 0 s s 
2-112 s s s s s s X X s 
2-113 0 0 s 0 s 0 s 0 s 
2-201 X s s 0 X s s s s 
2-202 X s s 0 s X s X X 
2-203 s s s 0 s s s X s 
2-204 s s s X s s s s s 
2-205 s s s 0 X s X X X 
2-206 s s s 0 X s X X s 
2-207 X s s 0 X s s s s 
2-301 s s s s s s s X s 
2-302 s s s s s s s X X 
2-401 X s 0 X 0 X X s X 
2-402 s s s X X s s s X 
2-403 s s s X X s s X X 
2-404 s s s s s X s X X 
2-501 X s s s s s s s s 
2-502 s s s s s X s s X 
2-503 ~ s s s s X s X X 
2-504 s s s s X s s s s 
2-505 X s s s s s X X X 
2-506 s s s s s s s s s 
2-507 s s s s s s s s s 
2-508 s s s X s s s s X 
2-509 s s s s s s s s s 
2-510 s s s s s s s s s 
2-511 s s s s X s s s s 
2-512 s s s s s s s s s 
2-513 s s s s s s s X X 
2-601 s s s s X s s s s 
2-602 X s s s s s s s s 
2-603 s s s s s s s s s 
2-604 s s s s s s s s s 
2-605 s s s s s s s X X 
2-606 s s s s s s s s s 
2-607 s s s s s s s s s 
2-608 s s s s X s X s s 
2-609 s s s s s s X s s 
2-610 s s s s s s s s s 
2-611 s s s s s s s X s 
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l!~~ _L_!daho ~-~~~ka N. Dakota Arizona Colorado S. Dakota Montana Nebraska Utah _ 
2-612 S S S S S S S S X 
2-701 s s s s s s s s s 
2-801 S S S S S S S X S 
2-802 s s s s s s s s s 
2-803 X S S S X 0 S X S 
2-901 0 S S S X S S X S 
2-902 X S S S X S S S S 
